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RECOUPMENT OF PENSION OVERPAYMENTS: EQUITABLE
LIENS AND MEANINGFUL REFORM AFTER MONTANILE
By Jeanne Medeiros* and Maria O’Brien Hylton**

I. INTRODUCTION
Beginning in 1961, Brendan Jones1 worked as a machine operator at
Obelisk Manufacturing (“Obelisk”) in Connecticut. Jones joined Obelisk as an
18 year-old right out of high school and worked there continuously until the
plant closed in 1995 when he was almost 52 years old. When he reached the
age of 55, Jones applied for and began receiving his pension in the amount of
$123.79 per month from the Obelisk plan. In July 2010, 12 years into
retirement, he received a notice from the plan informing him that it had made
an error in calculating his monthly benefit. The correct amount, he was told,
was $82.53 per month—a reduction of $41.26 or 33%. Then, in September of
2013 Jones received another notice from the plan that informed him, “When an
overpayment is discovered, the Plan is required to take steps to correct the
mistake and make the plan whole. To correct the overpayment of your
benefits, further periodic payments to you will be reduced. . .”2 At that point
his benefit was further reduced to $24.78 per month.
The Obelisk Plan acknowledged that it paid him an incorrect benefit
amount for approximately 12 years and that, as a result of this error, Jones
owed the plan a total of $8257.65.3 The plan’s solution to this self-created
problem was to reduce Jones’ payments by 70%.4 It is undisputed that Jones
was unaware of the overpayment error.5 The Plan also admits that Jones
provided accurate information about his personal and employment history—6in

* Director, The Pension Action Center, University of Massachusetts Boston.
** Professor of Law, Boston University. The authors wish to thank Jordan Shelton and Philip
Mackson for excellent research assistance and Michael Lauretano for tech help.
1. The names of all plan participants and of the plan sponsor are fictitious and have been
changed in order to honor a confidentiality agreement entered into between the sponsor and The
Pension Action Center in Boston, MA. Original documents are on file with the authors.
2. Letter from Jeanne M. Medeiros, Esq., to Plan Administrator (Jan. 12, 2015) (on file with
authors).
3. Letter from Plan Administrator to Jones, (July 23, 2010) (on file with authors).
4. Letter from Plan Administrator to Jones, (Sep. 3, 2013) (on file with authors).
5. Letter from Plan Administrator to Jones’ Attorney (April 6, 2015) (on file with authors).
6. Id.
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other words, the plan does not allege that Jones engaged in any fraud or
deception. The error was entirely the fault of the plan.
Jones was one of dozens of retired Obelisk Manufacturing participants
who were overpaid as a result of plan error.7 Some of the other retirees were
overpaid for as much as eighteen years.8 Like Jones, none of the other retirees
did anything to cause or encourage the overpayment, yet all were the targets of
a recoupment action and faced dramatic reductions in their monthly benefit
amounts.9
Fortunately, these retirees secured legal representation through the New
England Pension Assistance Project at the Pension Action Center in Boston.
The Project provides fee pension counseling and advocacy to New Englanders
through a grant from the U.S. Administration for Community Living/
Administration on Aging.10 Ultimately, their benefits were restored to the
correct levels set by the plan formula, and the plan stopped its recoupment
efforts against them.11
Unfortunately, recoupment actions like the ones Jones and his fellow
retirees faced are not uncommon. Although exact figures are hard to come
by,12 and the exact cause of the phenomenon in unknown, an increase in
recoupment actions could be traceable to the economic downturn of 2008.13
Recoupment actions in cases like Jones’—where there is no evidence of retiree
wrongdoing—are not only legal and increasingly common, but are also,
arguably, encouraged by an ERISA regulatory regime that has failed to place

7. Confidential case files of the Pension Action Center (on file with authors).
8. Id.
9. Letter from Jeanne M. Medeiros, Esq., to Plan Administrator (June 24, 2015) (on file
with authors).
The twelve named retirees were completely unaware that their benefit payments may
have been incorrectly calculated . . . . [T]he different methodologies outlined in the
plan document were not described in the Summary Plan Description given to
participants. The only methodology outlined in the SPD is consistent with their original
benefit amounts. They did nothing to cause any alleged overpayment of benefits. In all
of their contacts with the plan, they gave accurate and complete information about their
personal and employment histories. They relied on the plan administrator’s expertise
to properly calculate and pay the correct benefit amount. In fact, the plan does not
allege that the overpayment occurred due to any fault on the part of any of these
retirees. The alleged overpayment was, in fact, due completely to the plan’s own
calculation methodology.
Id. at 2.
10. Pension Action Center, Who We Can Help, UNIV. OF MASS. BOSTON, https://www.umb.
edu/pensionaction/who (last visited Feb. 2, 2017).
11. Confidential Settlement Agreement (on file with authors).
12. “There aren’t any statistics regarding pension overpayments, but senior advocates say
they have seen a spike of ‘recoupment’ cases, which are now one of the most common pension
problems some advocacy groups are handling. Mr. Freeborn [‘a lawyer with the Western States
Pension Assistance Project, a Sacramento, Calif., group that is partly funded by the U.S.
Administration on Aging’] now spends almost one-third of his working time handling
recoupment cases; a few years ago, the staff rarely saw such cases.” Ellen E. Schultz, ‘Overpaid’
Pensions Being Seized, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2010.
13. Id.
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responsibility for the errors where it properly belongs, namely with the plan
fiduciary or other entity that made the miscalculation.
This paper reviews the current state of recoupment actions for ERISA14
plans and argues that a few simple reforms are needed in order to protect the
typical target of these actions—elderly retirees who are often living on a fixed
income and who do not enjoy the option of reattaching to the labor force to
compensate for a dramatic reduction in lifestyle that follows from a successful
recoupment. Retirees are uniquely vulnerable to the mistakes and subsequent
corrections that plans seek to impose given their advanced age and limited
opportunities to earn additional income.15 When plans are solely responsible
for overpayments, they need to look elsewhere to make the plan whole
following the discovery of their error.
This paper argues that federal law does not in fact require a plan to
engage in aggressive recoupment efforts, and that equitable principles bar
recovery under circumstances in which the retiree would experience hardship.
In addition, in cases where the plan’s own gross negligence is responsible for
the overpayment, we argue that the plan fiduciary has breached its duty of
prudence to retirees. This fiduciary breach cannot be rectified by placing the
entire burden of compensating the plan directly on the shoulders of those who
are victims of the fiduciary’s gross negligence.
Finally, this paper reviews the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Montanile v. Board of Trustees of the National Elevator Industry Health Plan,
which affirmed that an equitable lien by agreement can only be enforced
14. Sections of ERISA that are relevant for this paper are as follows:
“Every employee benefit plan shall be established and maintained pursuant to a written
instrument. Such instrument shall provide for one or more named fiduciaries who jointly or
severally shall have authority to control and manage the operation and administration of the
plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2012).
“Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the responsibilities,
obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter shall be personally liable to
make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to
such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by
the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem
appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary.” 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2012).
15. See Jennifer Anders-Gable, Provisions for the Recoupment of Pension Plan
Overpayments, LOS ANGELES LAWYER, Nov. 2015, at 11.
A plan’s calculation error, whether administrative or otherwise, and failure to timely
discover the error, coupled with reliance on a promised monthly benefit, may demand
an exception to repayment suggestions found in the plan or elsewhere. In order to
protect the income security of older vulnerable retirees and incentivize fiduciaries to do
a better job administering their plan, more plans should heed recent IRS guidance and
waive overpayments, particularly when the action is against an elderly individual who
is unable to work and relies on his or her pension for life’s necessities. . . . Some
retirees will seek public benefits to replace suspended pensions or may face foreclosure
when their monthly income is no longer sufficient to cover mortgage payments. . . .
While a plan is permitted to correct future payments, it sometimes may be imprudent to
recoup from an unknowing overpaid retiree who was unable to prevent the error and is
unable to adjust his or her circumstances to make the plan whole.
Id. at 13.
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against a specific, identifiable fund in the possession of a defendant and not
against his general assets.16 Montanile concludes that tracing of assets is
required in order to enforce an equitable lien;17 for defendants who receive
lump sum payouts, this suggests that where overpayment dollars have already
been spent on, for example, basic living expenses, no recoupment will be
possible.
II. THE RECOUPMENT PHENOMENON
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) sets standards
for the operation of retirement plans sponsored by private companies.18 This
paper reviews the current state of the law with respect to recoupment actions
undertaken by these plans, and proposes prudent solutions to resolving the
conflicting forces involved in these situations.
As a preliminary matter, we note that ERISA only governs retirement
plans sponsored by private companies.19 It does not control state and local
governmental plans, most church plans, nor plans sponsored by the federal
government for its employees.20
Many pension plans were adversely affected by the economic downturn
that began in the last decade.21 At about the same time, Congress enacted the
Pension Protection Act of 2006, which imposed greater financial monitoring
and disclosure regarding the sufficiency of plan assets and the funded status of
ERISA-governed plans.22 As a result, plans may be auditing their funds and
their payments to retirees more closely.23 It is likely that this is one of the
reasons underlying the apparent uptick in overpayment recoupment actions.24
To understand recoupment efforts, it is important to keep in mind that two

16. “We hold that, when a participant dissipates the whole settlement on nontraceable items,
the fiduciary cannot bring a suit to attach the participant’s general assets under § 502(a)(3)
because the suit is not one for ‘appropriate equitable relief.’ In this case, it is unclear whether the
participant dissipated all of his settlement in this manner, so we remand for further proceedings.”
Montanile v. Bd. Of Trs. of the Nat’l Elevator Indus. Health Benefit Plan, 136 S. Ct. 651, 655
(2016).
17. Id. at 654. (“The Board's arguments in favor of the enforcement of an equitable lien
against Montanile's general assets are unsuccessful. Sereboff does not contain an exception to the
general asset-tracing requirement for equitable liens by agreement.”).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a)–(b).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)–(b).
20. Id.
21. See JUAN YERMO & CLARA SEVERINSON, THE IMPACT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS ON
DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS AND THE NEED FOR COUNTER-CYCLICAL FUNDING REGULATIONS,
OECD Working Papers on Finance, Insurance and Private Pensions, No. 3 (2010),
http://www.oecd.org/finance/private-pensions/45694491.pdf. See also Paul M. Secunda, The
Forgotten Employee Benefit Crisis: Multiemployer Benefit Plans on the Brink, 21 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 77, 78 (2011).
22. See generally Daniel B. Klaff, The Pension Protection Act of 2006: Reforming the
Defined Benefit Pension System, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 553 (2007).
23. See Jennifer Anders-Gable, supra note 15 at 11.
24. See Medeiros, supra note 9.
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forces are at play: first, ERISA-regulated pension plans must conform to IRS
guidelines in order to maintain their tax-qualified status.25 The statute does not
require plans to recover overpayments from participants and beneficiaries; on
the contrary, plans are free to recover from the plan sponsor (employer) or
other parties.26 However, plans frequently assert that they are legally obligated
to recover from participants and often seek to collect interest on the unpaid
balance on the theory that the overpayment was a “loan”.27
It is worth noting that overpayments are not limited to private, ERISAregulated plans. Overpayments have also occurred in both the Social Security
and public pension contexts.28 The approach taken when an overpayment is
discovered in these other situations is strikingly different from that described in
the Obelisk Manufacturing case. With respect to public plans, both CalPERS
and CalSTRS in California have statutes of limitations that forbid long
reachbacks of the sort applied to Jones and his fellow retirees.29 For federal
25. “Pension plans often cite their tax-qualified status as the reason why they must recoup
from the recipient. Often, a plan asserts that it is required to recover overpaid funds and therefore
a retiree’s pension must be stopped until the funds are recouped. In some cases, the plan claims it
is obligated to demand a six-figure, plus interest, lump sum return of the overpayment.” AndersGable, supra note 15, at 11.
26. “The IRS recently revised its regulations . . . to clarify its position in recoupment
matters. IRS Revenue Procedure 2015-27 states that ‘depending on the facts and circumstances,
correcting an Overpayment . . . may not need to include requesting that an Overpayment be
returned to the plan by plan participants and beneficiaries.’ . . . The IRS now explicitly states that
‘an employer or another person’ can repay the plan, with appropriate interest, ‘in lieu of seeking
recoupment from plan participants ad beneficiaries.’” Id. at 11.
27. See Samantha Valerius, Safeguarding a Portion of the Retirement Nest Egg: ERISA and
the Need for Regulations in Restricting Companies’ Ability to Recoup Overpayment of Pension
Funds Made to Struggling Retirees, 33 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 423, 433 (2012) (“In
addition to asserting that retirees have received unearned money, some companies maintain that
these overpayments are interest-free loans. However, the PBGC has countered this phrase with
the term ‘unsolicited loans,’ which seems to be the more appropriate verbiage for these
overpayments, as the retiree is forced to pay back a loan that he never wanted and, in fact, never
knew that he had. Furthermore, companies have posited that if the situation were reversed (if the
company had made underpayments to retirees), the retiree would most likely be requesting the
additional payments due to him even if the retiree had made the mistake in the first place.”); see
also Appellees’ Brief at 40, Burns v. Corning Inc., 178 F.3d 1278 (3d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-3527)
(“It is undeniable that the Committee’s liberal recoupment determination has assured that
Remington will transition to the status quo ante without any significant hardship. As of the time
of trial, Remington had owned the mobile home for five years and she had not repaid the Plan one
dollar of the more than $10,000 in overpayments she received between 1993 and 1995. She has
no obligation to begin repayments until she retires in 2000, and then she will have more than 18
years to fully repay the Plan. . . . Her enjoyment of an interest-free and principal-free loan can
hardly be characterized as a detriment. The withdrawal of the 401(k) funds also benefited
Remington, because she used the funds to extinguish unrelated debt that she had incurred at very
high interest rates.”).
28. Irrespective of the type of plan, overpayments can result from data entry errors,
confusion about plan terms, and confusion about the interplay between collective bargaining
agreements and plan terms and errors in employment history. Plan terminations and the merger or
sale of a plan sponsor have also been identified as sources of overpayment errors. See Valerius,
supra note 27, at 429–33.
29. See CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 20164 (West 2016) (discussing the statute of limitations for
CalPERS: “For the purposes of payments into or out of the retirement fund for adjustment of
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government employees, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) “has
guidelines in place that deal with how quickly and aggressively the Federal
Employees Retirement System and the Social Security Administration can
reduce benefits or recoup overpayments when equitable remedies and
hardships come into play.”30
Likewise, Social Security “has a similar no-fault equity and good
conscience requirement,” under 42 U.S.C. § 404(b).31 That section states that
the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) “shall
specifically take into account any physical, mental, educational, or linguistic
limitation such individual may have (including any facility with the English
language).”32 ERISA, though, as many have33 noted, contains no such explicit
limitations on recoupment. Unsurprisingly, some private plans have taken full
advantage of this regulatory vacuum.34 Many private plans take the view that
errors or omissions, whether pursuant to Section 20160, 20163, or 20532, or otherwise, the period
of limitation of actions shall be three years, and shall be applied as follows: (1) In cases where
this system makes an erroneous payment to a member or beneficiary, this system's right to collect
shall expire three years from the date of payment. (2) In cases where this system owes money to a
member or beneficiary, the period of limitations shall not apply.”); see also 1988 STATE
LEGISLATION, http://www.calstrs.com/post/1988-state-legislation (last visited July 26, 2016) (SB2682, CalSTRS, has a “statute of limitations of 3 years for adjustments of errors or omissions. .
.”).
30. Sean Forbes, Fiduciary Responsibility: As Pension Recoupment Grows, Advocates For
Pensioners Offer Advice to Agencies, Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) (42 BPR 882) at *2 (May 19,
2015). For examples, “Under 5 U.S.C. § 8470, recovery of overpayments may not be made when
in the judgment of the OPM, ‘the individual is without fault and recovery would be against equity
and good conscience.’” Id. Additionally, “Under FERS regulations, ‘against equity and good
conscience’ includes financial hardship. The FERS regulations define financial hardship as
applying when the benefits recipient ‘needs substantially all of his or her current income and
liquid assets to meet current ordinary and necessary living expenses and liabilities.’” Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 2.
33. See Valerius, supra note 27, at 438–39 (“There is also no limitation for how far back
companies can go to seek overpayments. Retiree Charlie Craven was required to return
overpayments that spanned eighteen years. . . . Without any limitations on . . . how far back the
company can seek to recoup overpayments, the retiree could face paying back the overpayments
for the rest of his life.”); Letter from Ellen A. Bruce, Senior Fellow, Gerontology Institute, to
Internal Revenue Service (July 16, 2015) (on file with authors) at 3 (“At this point there is no
limit on how far back a plan can go in calculating an overpayment. If, for instance, there was a
benefit calculation mistake that occurred 25 years ago, a plan can recalculate the benefit and seek
to recoup from the participant 25 years of the overpayment.”); Memorandum from Ellen A.
Bruce, Director Pension Action Center, to Phyllis Borzi, Assistant Secretary of Labor (Nov. 19,
2013) (on file with authors), at 4 (“There should be some time limit to how long a plan can look
back for recoupment. The three year limitation used by the PBGC seems a reasonable time for
recouping overpayments that retirees did not cause.”).
34. See Forbes, supra note 30. For example, in the Sheet Metal Workers Local 73 Pension
Plan case, plan trustees engaged in what has been described as among the most aggressive
recoupment efforts in modern times. The Hillside Illinois plan was audited in May 2010 and the
audit found both overpayments and underpayments dating back to 1974. In 2014 the plan filed a
proposal with the IRS’ Voluntary Correction Program “to pursue recoupments, with some going
back 34 years, and for amounts in the tens of thousands, or even hundreds of thousands, of
dollars. The plan trustees went after nearly 600 plan participants, and informed recipients who
weren’t expected to live long enough to pay by installments that they would have to pay
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because they are obligated to ensure that the plan is compensated for an
overpayment, and because ERISA does not prohibit recovery from a plan
participant, this is the best option.35 The appeal of this approach to plan
administrators who can quickly adjust future payouts to current retirees
requires no further comment.
The second force that tugs on plans that have uncovered an overpayment
seems to be a genuine sense on the part of plan fiduciaries that a retiree who
has been overpaid has been unjustly enriched at the expense of the plan. There
is, of course, a sense in which any over payment results in an “unjust” (and
legally unwarranted) payment to the recipient. In the private pension context
of defined benefit plans,36 however, where all participants and beneficiaries are
profoundly dependent upon both good plan administration as well as
investment results that are consistent with actuarial expectations, it is not hard
to understand why an overpayment to some may be viewed as a direct harm to
others. The collective defined benefit pot, when badly managed, does at least
in theory, result in direct losses to other participants.37 In other words, an unimmediately with a lump sum . . . .” Id. (quoting Karen Ferguson, Director of the Pension Rights
Center in D.C.).
35. ERISA was therefore enacted to ensure that retirees were protected and to guarantee
that companies were dealing with pension funds in a reliable manner. . . . Above all, the Act was
to “protect the interests of participants and their beneficiaries.” . . . The Act states that a company,
acting as a fiduciary, “shall discharge [its] duties with respect to a [pension] plan solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries and . . . with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence
under the circumstances.” That is, companies must act in the interest of all plan participants, not
individual retirees. With respect to pension overpayments, this means the company needs to
return the overpaid money to the pension plan in order to act in the best interest of all plan
participants. . . . The Act does not expressly state which of these three should be required to
return the overpayments, but most companies read the Act as requiring them to recoup the
overpayment from the retiree. Valerius, supra note 27, at 426–27.
36. ZVI BODIE ET AL., PENSIONS IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 139 (1988).
Although employer pension programs vary in design, they are usually classified into
two broad types: defined contribution and defined benefit. These two categories are
distinguished in the law under ERISA. Under a defined contribution (DC) plan each
employee has an account into which the employer and, if it is a contributory plan, the
employee make regular contributions. Benefit levels depend on the total contributions
and investment earnings of the accumulation in the account. Often the employee has
some choice regarding the type of assets in which the accumulation is invested and can
easily find out what its value is at any time. Defined contribution plans are, in effect,
tax-deferred savings accounts in trust for the employees, and they are by definition
fully funded. They are therefore not of much concern to government regulators and are
not covered by Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) insurance. In a defined
benefit (DB) plan the employee’s pension benefit entitlement is determined by a
formula which takes into account years of service for the employer and, in most cases,
wages or salary. Many defined benefit formulas also take into account the Social
Security benefits to which an employee is entitled. These are the so-called integrated
plans.
Id. at 139.
37. See Comparison of Traditional Defined Benefit with Traditional Defined Contribution
Plans, CUCFA (last visited July 25, 2016), http://cucfa.org/news/pension_table.html. In DC
plans, “[e]mployees absorb investment risk in exchange for potential investment rewards,” while
DB plans make the “[e]mployer absorb investment risk in exchange for investment control.” Id.
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recovered overpayment to you may lead to a reduction in funds available to
pay me. Of course, the plan remains liable to pay me the full benefit I am
entitled to under the plan. Therefore, it has a strong incentive to recover any
overpaid benefits in the easiest and most efficient way possible—by reducing
the ongoing monthly benefit of the retiree who was incorrectly overpaid. It
comes as no surprise then that practitioners report soaring numbers of
recoupment actions following the economic collapse of 2008.38
However, as discussed in Section III,39 American courts have typically
required more than a mere assertion of an overpayment in order to permit
recovery on a theory of unjust enrichment.
III. PHILLIPS, MONTANILE, AND LUMP SUMS
It will come as no surprise that in cases in which the fiduciary duty of care
and prudence is negatively implicated by a plan error (as opposed to fraud on
the part of a plan participant for example), the federal courts have for some
time linked the fiduciary breach to the sought-after remedy of recoupment.40
The problem of overpayments is not new and the targets of recoupment actions
have long sought to place blame with the plan fiduciary as part of an effort to
resist repayment.41
A. Phillips Decision
For example, in Phillips v. Maritime Ass’n ILA Local Pension Plan,42 the
federal district court for the Eastern District of Texas rejected an attempt by a
While DC plans may be safer for all parties, DB plans provide a risk-reward for both parties. See,
id.
38. Schultz, supra note 12.
39. See discussion infra Section III.
40. See Jennifer Anders-Gable, supra note 15, at 11–12 (citing Phillips v. Maritime Ass’n
ILA Pension Plan,194 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Tex. 2001)).
41. See, e.g., Jennifer Anders-Gable, supra note 15, at 11. See also Phillips, 194 F. Supp.
2d at 552 ("This case involves the question of an ERISA plan's ability to recoup benefit
overpayments by drastically reducing monthly payments, when the overpayments were the result
of a breach of fiduciary duty.").
42. Phillips v. Maritime Ass’n ILA Pension Plan, 194 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Tex. 2001).
[T]he fiduciary should exert at least that duty of care that a reasonably prudent person
would exert in his own affairs under like circumstances. In short, the fiduciary must
exercise his position of trust so as, at the very minimum, not to harm the beneficiary as
a result of his failure to exercise reasonable care. The prudent person standard
imposed by ERISA provides that the fiduciary shall discharge her duties “with the care,
skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent
man acting in like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of
an enterprise of a like character and with like aims” 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). Hunt
violated the prudent person standard imposed by Section 1104(a)(1) of ERISA. By:
[sic] (1) failing to seek and follow the advice of Plan counsel that every DRO should
be submitted to an actuary; (2) failing to submit the DROs to the Plan actuary; (3)
failing to submit the QDROs to an actuary; and (4) representing to Plaintiffs that the
stated amounts would be the amounts they received.
Id. at 555–56 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
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plan to recover overpayments by reducing promised future benefits to a group
of former wives of plan participants who had obtained otherwise valid
QDROs.43 The ex-wives argued that the overpayments were unfair and
unauthorized given that the plan administrator violated the prudent person
standard by failing to submit the QDROs to the plan actuary before qualifying
them.44 The court agreed with the ex-wives and noted that the plan as
administrated violated the prudent person standard by failing to submit the
QDROs to the actuary even though counsel for the plan had advised that this
step be taken.45
In language that is easily applicable to the Obelisk retirees, the court
noted: “[t]hese older women depended on the dollar amounts not only stated in
the QDROs . . . but actually distributed to them for years, when planning the
rest of their lives. They neither knew nor had reason to know that the monthly
benefits were incorrect. [They] suffered and continue to suffer as a result of
[the] recoupment efforts.”46 In rejecting the plan’s effort to recover under a
43. See id.
Congress created the QDRO structure when it amended ERISA with the Retirement
Equity Act (“REA”) of 1984. The REA enhanced ERISA’s protection of divorced
spouses and their interest in retirement funds earned during marriage; see also Boggs,
520 U.S. at 848, 117 S. Ct. at 1763. “The QDRO provisions protect those persons who,
often as a result of divorce, might not receive the benefits they otherwise would have
had available during their retirement as a means of income.” Id. at 854, 117 S. Ct. at
1767. Thus, the REA amendments require each pension plan to provide for “the
payment of benefits in accordance with the applicable requirements of any qualified
domestic relations order.” 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A) (2012). Furthermore, “[e]ach
plan shall establish reasonable procedures to determine the qualified status of domestic
relations orders and to administer distributions under such qualified orders.” 29 U.S.C.
§ 1056(d)(3)(G)(ii) (2012).
Phillips, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 554–55.
44. Phillips, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 555–56. For guidance on how plans should create
procedures, see DOL Provides Guidance on Qualified Domestic Relations Orders, PENSION
ANALYST (Prudential Retirement, Sept. 1997).
Every plan is required to establish written procedures. Plan procedures should be
established to ensure that QDRO determinations are made in a timely, efficient and
cost-effective manner. When a DRO is received, the plan administrator must promptly
notify the affected participant and each alternate payee named in the order to
acknowledge receipt. In addition, the plan administrator must provide a copy of the
plan's procedures. A plan’s QDRO procedures must:

Be in writing;

Be reasonable;

Provide that each person specified in a DRO will be notified of the plan's
procedures for making a QDRO determination; and

Permit an alternate payee to designate a representative for receipt of copies
of notices and plan information that are sent to the alternate payee with
respect to a DRO.
The DOL has indicated that QDRO procedures are not reasonable if they hamper the
determination of a QDRO or the distribution of payments under the QDRO. For
example, a procedure that requires a participant or alternate payee to pay a fee or
charges a participant's account to qualify the DRO is not reasonable.
Id. at 3.
45. Phillips, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 556.
46. Id.
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theory of restitution, the court highlighted that the core problem—a long
period of reliance on an overly generous pension payment—was the direct
result of the fiduciary breach of a duty owed to participants and their
beneficiaries.47 But for this breach, the ex-wives would have received a
correct payout initially and not come to rely on a larger amount.48 The court
declined to allow recoupment of the overpayment (although it did approve of a
lower, corrected payout going forward) because of the plan’s own culpability
in creating the conditions that later gave rise to the need for an adjustment.49
B. Post-Phillips
In spite of the early and clear signal in Phillips that culpability was a
necessary and critical part of the analysis in recoupment cases, plans continued
to reduce benefits not just to their proper level after uncovering the error, but
further, in order to recoup overpayments. In Kapp v. Sedgwick50 and Weiner v.
Elizabeth Board of Educ.,51 the courts again grappled with plan assertions that
the overpayments constituted unjust enrichment for which the only fair remedy
was repayment. Kapp involved an employee who was forced to leave work due
to a disability.52 He received short term and then long-term disability benefits
as well as Social Security Disability benefits (SSDI).53 During this time his
former employer was merged and acquired in a series of corporate
transactions.54
Kapp repeatedly disclosed to the plan administrator his SSDI benefit over
many years.55 The plan administrator repeatedly reaffirmed that his disability
payment was correct.56 Finally in 2010 the administrator discovered that
47. Id.
48. Id. at 557 (“The court does not believe it would be equitable for the Plaintiffs to bear the
weight of an error that Hunt could have prevented by upholding her duty as plan administrator
and allowing an actuary to check the QDROs.”).
49. The Phillips court noted that the plan might yet be able to recover the overpayments
from trustees or others who might subsequently be found liable for the oversight. Id. at 557.
Recovery from the beneficiaries, however, was prohibited on the ground that “the balance of
equities weighs in favor of disallowing [it]….” Id.
50. Kapp v. Sedgwick CMS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 2, 2013)
(“[T]he Court further holds that, due, in part, to the facts that Plaintiff relied on the correctness of
the monthly amounts for a period of over eight years and repeatedly disclosed information that
revealed the plan administrator's mistake of overpaying, Defendants are equitably barred from
recovering the mistaken overpayments made up to the date hereof.”).
51. Weiner v. Elizabeth Bd. of Educ., 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1729, at *5 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2013). The New Jersey court noted that the standard for evaluating a claim of
unjust enrichment in the state was that “[i]t is a general rule that a payment of money under a
mistake of fact may be recovered, provided that such recovery will not prejudice the payee. This
rule is grounded upon considerations of equity and fair dealing. It is considered unjust
enrichment to permit a recipient to retain money paid because of a mistake, unless the
circumstances are such that it would be inequitable to require its return.” Id. (citations omitted).
52. Kapp, 2013 U.S. Dis. LEXIS 219, at *2.
53. Id. at *2–*4,
54. Id. at *3.
55. Id. at *4.
56. Id. at *5.

2017

MEDEIROS & HYLTON: PENSION OVERPAYMENTS

205

Kapp’s SSDI benefit had never been deducted as required from his plan benefit
amount.57 Kapp was offered three choices: (1) he could repay the $162,308.21
overage in full; (2) he could be subject to a period of benefit withholding to
effect repayment; or (3) he could be subject to a reduction of $500 per month
until the overage was repaid.58 Kapp elected option three and sued.59
Noting that this area of law is governed by trust law and not contract law,
the Kapp court pointed to the long period of reliance on the plan’s calculations
and the repeated disclosure to the plan by Kapp of his SSDI award and rejected
the plan’s claim for recoupment.60 As in Phillips more than a decade earlier,
the court found that the equities favored Kapp and barred recovery of the
overpayment.61 Kapp, however, was not entitled to the incorrect higher benefit
amount going forward.62
C. Montanile and Recoupment of lump sums
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision in the Montanile
case63 which, like Phillips and Kapp, casts serious doubt on the sorts of plan
tactics seen in cases where recoupment of a lump sum payout is sought.
Beginning with Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson,64 which
limited relief in a plan reimbursement case to “equitable relief” only and
excluded money damages or damages typically available in a court of law, and
Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services Inc.,65 which essentially sanctioned

57. Id. at *6.
58. Kapp, 2013 U.S. Dis. LEXIS 219, at *6.
59. Id. at *1.
60. Id. at *11–15.
61. Id. at *13–15; see Phillips, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 556.
62. In Kapp the court identified six factors to be used in determining whether equitable
principles bar recovery in an ERISA mistaken overpayments situation: 1. The amount of time
which has passed since the overpayment was made; 2. The effect that recoupment would have on
that income; 3. The nature of the mistake made by the administrator; 4. The amount of the
overpayment; 5. The beneficiary’s total income; and 6. The beneficiary’s use of the money at
issue. Kapp, 2013 U.S. Dis. LEXIS 219 at *10.
63. Montanile v. Bd. of Trs. of the Nat’l Elevator Indus. Health Ben. Plan, 136 S. Ct. 651,
653 (2016) (holding, “[w]hen an ERISA-plan participant wholly dissipates a third-party
settlement on nontraceable items, the plan fiduciary may not bring suit under §502(a)(3) to attach
the participant's separate assets.”).
64. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 220–21 (2002). For a
critique of the majority’s opinion in Great-West, see Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in which she
describes the revival of the law/equity distinction in connection with ERISA remedies as
“fanciful” and “antiquarian” and unnecessary. “The rarefied rules underlying this rigid and timebound conception of the term “equity” were hardly at the fingertips of those who enacted [the
remedial provisions of ERISA]. By 1974, when ERISA became law, the “days of the divided
bench” were a fading memory, for that era had ended nearly 40 years earlier with the advent of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.… It is thus fanciful to attribute to members of the 93 rd
Congress familiarity with those “needless and obsolete distinctions [cites omitted] much less a
deliberate “choice” to resurrect and import them wholesale into the modern regulatory scheme
laid out in ERISA.”) Id. at 225.
65. See generally Sereboff v. Mid. Atl. Med. Servs, 547 U.S. 356 (2006). The Sereboffs
were injured in a car accident and their medical expenses were covered by Marlene Sereboff’s
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recovery from insureds by insurer who had paid medical bills so long as the
settlement fund was distinct and identifiable, the Supreme Court has worked to
develop a set of coherent rules with respect to equitable liens consistent with
the remedies available in courts of equity (and not courts of law). Prior to
Montanile in which the Court resolved this issue, plans with pension
recoupment claims assumed the equitable lien was the amount of the
overpayment, which in some cases might be specific and distinct enough to
permit repayment.66 However, in the typical recoupment scenario it was still
often the case that specificity was lacking when the funds routinely became
part of a retiree’s monthly assets and were spent on groceries, rent, and other
necessary expenses. Under these circumstances, an equitable lien cannot be
enforced against a retiree who has been overpaid.
In its recent Montanile decision, the Court reaffirmed that an equitable
lien may only be enforced against a specific, identifiable fund that is in the
defendant’s possession.67 The facts are pretty straightforward: Robert
Montanile was injured in a car accident.68 The plan covered about $120,000 in
medical expenses for Mr. Montanile, who filed a tort claim against the drunk
driver who hit him.69 Montanile recovered $500,000, about half of which was
set aside for attorneys’ fees.70 The plan demanded reimbursement from the
settlement, and $120,000 was set aside while Montanile’s lawyer negotiated
with the plan.71 Negotiations stalled and the lawyer notified the plan that he
would release the funds to Montanile within two weeks.72 The funds were
released and six months later, the plan sued.73
The Supreme Court overturned the Eleventh Circuit, which like a majority
of circuit courts,74 had concluded that Montanile needed to turn the funds over
employer-sponsored health plan. Id. The Sereboffs obtained a $750,000 tort settlement and the
plan sought reimbursement of $75000. Id. The demand for reimbursement was based on plan
document language (“Acts of Thirds Parties”) in which beneficiaries promised to reimburse the
plan for all third party recoveries. Id. The Court said the plan was entitled to reimbursement as
“appropriate equitable relief.” Id. The Acts of Third Parties language in the contract created an
equitable lien on the tort settlement obtained by the Sereboffs. Id. It was critical that there was an
identifiable, specific fund separate from the Sereboffs general assets out of which the plan could
be reimbursed. Id.
66. Montanile, 136 S. Ct. at 656.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 655–56.
69. Id. at 653.
70. Id. at 656.
71. Id.
72. Montanile, 136 S. Ct. at 656.
73. Id. at 656.
74. In its Montanile decision, “the Eleventh Circuit relied on its recent holding in AirTran
Airways, Inc. v. Elem, in which it ruled that for the purpose of equitable lien rights under ERISA,
settlement funds were ‘specifically identifiable’ even after they are no longer in the possession of
the plaintiff-plan member; a plan member’s dissipation of the funds thus could not destroy the
lien that attached before the dissipation. The Eleventh Circuit’s ruling reinforced its holding in
Elem and falls in line with the opinions of six other circuit courts. Two circuits, however,
currently take the opposite view, finding that ERISA does not provide for recovery of a plan’s
equitable lien against dissipated settlement proceeds and at the time of an ERISA action a ‘strict
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to the plan because dissipation was irrelevant.75 Citing “standard equity
treatises,”76 the Court readily reaffirmed the longstanding requirement that
specific funds remain in the defendant’s hands or at least be traceable to items
that were purchased with those funds—identifiable property like real estate or
a vehicle.77 Expenditure of the funds on non-traceable items such as groceries
or travel destroys an equitable lien.78 If the equitable lien is destroyed, the plan
may still have a personal claim against the defendant’s general assets but
recovering from those assets is a legal remedy rather than an equitable one.79
D. Post-Montanile
A critical part of the analysis in these recoupment cases, then, is the
location of the funds from the lump sum payout, and if they are no longer in
the possession of the participant, are they traceable? In many of the
recoupment cases involving large, one-time payouts, one would expect that the
funds will be long gone and untraceable by the time the plan discovers its
errors. Funds expended each month on rent, food, and prescription drugs,
which are typically significant expenses for low- and moderate-income
retirees, are not recoverable with an equitable lien.
It is important to note that the plan bears the burden of proving that the
participant or beneficiary still has the funds.80 Should a plan decide to pursue
tracing’ of the funds from settlement to the plan member’s (or his/her attorney) actual or
constructive possession is required.” Nicholas W. D’Aquila et al., U.S. Supreme Court Grants
Cert in Montanile v. National Elevator - Will the Court 'trace' its Roots Back to Sereboff?, 11
ABA HEALTH ESOURCE 11 (July 2015). “The First, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh
Circuits have issued opinions allowing a plan to enforce an equitable lien against dissipated
settlement proceeds under ERISA. The Ninth and Eighth Circuits have held that plans are not
entitled to such a remedy.” Id. at note 5. Compare Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Health &
Welfare Fund v. Lewis, 745 F.3d 283, 285 (7th Cir. 2014), and AirTranAirways, Inc. v. Elem,
767 F.3d 1192, 1198–99 (11th Cir. 2014), and Thurber v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 712 F.3d 654, 664
(2d Cir. 2013), and Funk v. CIGNA Grp. Ins., 648 F.3d 182, 194 (3d Cir. 2011); Cusson v.
Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 592 F.3d 215, 231 (1st Cir. 2010), and Longaberger Co. v.
Kolt, 586 F.3d 459, 466–67 (6th Cir. 2009), with Treasurer, Trs. of Drury Indus., Inc. Health Care
Plan & Trust v. Goding, 692 F.3d 888, 897 (8th Cir. 2012), and Bilyeu v. Morgan Stanley Long
Term Disability Plan, 683 F.3d 1083, 1095 (9th Cir. 2012).
75. Montanile, 136 S. Ct. at 656.
76. Id. at 658 (“those treatises make clear that a plaintiff could ordinarily enforce an
equitable lien only against specifically identified funds that remain in the defendant’s possession
or against traceable items that the defendant purchased with the funds (e.g., identifiable property
like a car). A defendant’s expenditure of the entire identifiable fund on nontraceable items (like
food or travel) destroys an equitable lien. The plaintiff then may have a personal claim against the
defendant’s general assets—but recovering out of those assets is a legal remedy, not an equitable
one.”).
77. Id. at 654.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 658.
80. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 215 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1937) (“A
person whose property is wrongfully taken by another is not entitled to priority over other
creditors unless he proves that the wrongdoer not only once had the property or its proceeds, but
still has the property or its proceeds or property in which the claimant's property or its proceeds
have been mingled indistinguishably.”).
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recoupment after Montanile, the plan will need to follow basic tracing rules.81
In the case of low- and moderate-income retirees, we would expect that
comingling and dissipation of the funds will be very common. In the case of
higher income retirees, it will likely be easier to identify specific assets—autos,
stocks, or real estate—against which an equitable lien may be enforced. It is
important to note that the Court pointed out that an asset would first need to be
seized and sold to satisfy the lien.82 An equitable lien must be distinguished
from a constructive trust: the asset itself cannot be turned over to the plan
pursuant to a lien83 in the way it could be turned over to a trust.84
IV. REFORMS AND INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR NEGLIGENCE TRIGGERING
RECOUPMENT ACTIONS
In addition to the improved legal environment for lump sum retirees
facing a recoupment action after Montanile, there appears to be growing
consensus that some combination of legislative and administrative reforms are
needed in order to avoid overly aggressive recoupment efforts against retirees
who are both without fault and without the resources to adjust to dramatic
drops in their monthly retirement income.85 This paper reviews some of the
81. Montanile, 136 S. Ct. at 654.
82. Montanile, 136 S. Ct. at 661 (“To the extent that courts endorsed any version of the
swollen assets theory, they adopted a more limited rule: that commingling a specifically identified
fund—to which a lien attached—with a different fund of the Defendant’s did not destroy the lien.
Instead, that commingling allowed the plaintiff to recover the amount of the lien from the entire
pot of money. (citations omitted) Thus, even under the version of the swollen assets doctrine
adopted by some courts, recovery out of Montanile’s general assets — in the absence of
commingling — would not have been ‘typically available’ relief.”).
83. Id. at 659–60 (“The question we faced in Sereboff was whether plaintiffs seeking an
equitable lien by agreement must “identify an asset they originally possessed, which was
improperly acquired and converted into property the defendant held.” We observed that such a
requirement, although characteristic of restitutionary relief, does not ‘appl[y] to equitable liens by
agreement or assignment.’ That is because the basic premise of an equitable lien by agreement is
that, rather than physically taking the plaintiff’s property, the defendant constructively possesses
a fund to which the plaintiff is entitled. But the plaintiff must still identify a specific fund in the
defendant’s possession to enforce the lien.”).
84. “A constructive trust is a relationship with respect to property subjecting the person by
whom the title to the property is held to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground
that his acquisition or retention of the property is wrongful and that he would be unjustly enriched
if he were permitted to retain the property.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 1(e) (AM.
LAW INST. 1959). “An equitable lien can be established and enforced only if there is some
property which is subject to the lien. Where property is subject to an equitable lien and the owner
of the property disposes of it and acquires other property in exchange, he holds the property so
acquired subject to the lien… So also, where the property which is subject to the lien is mingled
with other property in one indistinguishable mass, the lien can be enforced against the mingled
mass Where, however, the property subject to the equitable lien can no longer be traced, the
equitable lien cannot be enforced (citations omitted).” RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION, §
161(e) (AM. LAW INST. 1937). “The distinction between the remedy of imposing an equitable lien
and that of imposing a constructive trust is brought out in the numerous cases involving following
money into its product.” See id. (Reporter’s Notes citing Scott, The Right to Follow Money
Wrongfully Mingled with Other Money, 27 HARV. L. REV. 125 (1913)).
85. See discussion infra Section IV.A–C.
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commonly offered proposals for reform and also suggests that a fairly simple
solution would be the addition of insurance to cover plans in the event that
they uncover their own negligently caused error. Many retirees, like Jones,
who do not receive lump sum payouts would benefit from one or more of these
proposals.

A. Adopt a Statute of Limitations on Recoupment Actions and Limit
Reductions to 10% of Benefit Amount
It appears that the most commonly proposed solution86 to the recoupment
problem described here is the formal adoption by plans of maximum three-year
statutes of limitations that would limit plans’ ability to collect overpayments.
The notion is fairly simple: a three-year limit would cap the total overpayment
amount and keep it from becoming a figure that unduly burdens a retiree.87
With a limited amount at issue, the likelihood that a low- or moderate-income
retiree would be able to agree to a reasonable repayment plan increases. A
three-year look back limit combined with a rule limiting the maximum
reduction in ongoing benefit payments to 10%88 would further protect the
86. See Valerius, supra note 27.
An additional reform can either establish a statute of limitations for recoupment actions
or can limit how far back overpayments can be recouped. Senator Harkin's bill
prohibited recoupment if the company failed to commence the action within 3-years of
the initial overpayment. The statute of limitations would ensure retirees would only
have to pay back a maximum of three years worth of overpayments. Similarly, ERISA
could require that companies only recoup overpayments that were made over a limited
number of years. For example, if the retiree was overpaid for ten years, the company
would only be able to recoup two, three, or five years of overpayments. While both of
these resolutions would help limit the amount that retirees would be expected to pay
back and thus relieve the financial burden of having to pay back many years of
overpayments, the second solution, limiting how far back overpayments can be
recouped, would better benefit both parties. Establishing a statute of limitations on
companies would likely mean that companies would not be able to acquire any
overpayments since some companies do not recognize the overpayment error until
years after the initial mistake had been made.
Id. at 448; see also Memorandum from Ellen A. Bruce to Phyllis Borzi, supra note 33, at 3.
87. Valerius, supra note 27, at 448.
88. See id. at 447–48.
The PBGC has proposed . . . monthly limitations on recoupment. The PBGC once
proposed that recoupment of overpayments should be decided by: Computing the ratio
of the net overpayments to be recouped to the total value of the participant's
benefit...The percentage reduction [would be] computed by dividing the total
overpayment subject to recoupment by the present value of the...benefits and
multiplying by 100 percent...Because recoupment under [this] proposed method is
spread over the entire term of the benefit payments to the participant or beneficiary, the
monthly reduction in benefits [would] generally be less than...a flat 10 percent
reduction. Limiting a company's recoupment practices, by either requiring it to utilize a
methodical calculation like the one proposed by the PBGC or by establishing that
monthly reductions cannot exceed 10 percent of the retiree's monthly pension payment,
would free resources in order to fight the recoupment action and also ease the retiree's
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ability of retirees to maintain their standard of living while also improving the
likelihood of repayment.
For example, if X was overpaid $5000 per year by her plan for 10 years,
say from 2005 to 2015, the plan would be limited under the rules we envision,
to a maximum recovery of $15,000 instead of $50,000. The likelihood that a
reasonable repayment plan could be formulated is greatly enhanced when the
overpayment period is capped.
Currently, there is no statute of limitations applicable to recoupment
actions which exposes participants (who are often elderly and of very limited
means) to astronomical repayment amounts. We propose the adoption of a
three year limit which will promote basic fairness and encourage plans to be
much more proactive about monitoring, discovering and promptly addressing
their own accounting errors.
Of course, a three-year statute of limitations would prevent plans from
full recovery in cases where the overpayment took place over many years.
However, the statute, like its corollary in criminal statutes,89 is designed to
promote overall fairness. Properly designed, it should promote fiduciary
responsibility, and regular audits, and enhanced oversight, while also
protecting participants from sudden, devastating payment demands.
B. Amend Regulations to Require Explicit Consideration of Participant’s
Ability to Repay
A plan participant’s ability to repay an erroneous overpayment will turn
on two issues: first, the dollar amount of the overage amortized over some
reasonable period as a percentage of the retiree’s income in retirement; and
second, the added burden imposed by interest charges when a plan deems the
overpayment to have been an interest-free loan. Frankly, it is hard to see how a
rational actor would have agreed to the “loan” terms the plan typically
proposes. The repayment amount (the “loan principal”) is often so large that
repayment at a reasonable rate requires a dramatic reduction in lifestyle.90
Few rational consumers would agree to such terms. When interest is
financial burden of paying back the recoupment.
Id. at 447–48 (citing Benefit Reductions in Terminated Single-Employer Pension Plans and
Recoupment of Benefit Overpayments, 48 Fed. Reg. 50111-01, 50116 (proposed Oct. 31, 1983)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2623)).
89. See Rinat Kitai-Sagero, Between Due Process and Forgiveness: Revisiting Criminal
Statutes of Limitations, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 423, 424 (2013) (“Most countries adopt statutes of
limitations barring prosecution after a certain period of time from the occurrence of the crime.
The United States Supreme Court praised such statutes: [‘]Statutes of limitation are vital to the
welfare of society and are favored in the law. They are found and approved in the all systems of
enlightened jurisprudence. They promote repose by giving security and stability to human affairs.
An important public policy lies at their foundation. They stimulate to activity and punish
negligence.[’] Customary conceptions view statutes of limitations as providing fairness to the
defendant and as being productive for society.”).
90. See discussion supra Section I.
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added to the “loan” the burden becomes even greater as the likelihood of
voluntarily having consented to such an arrangement, which of course includes
“calling in” the “loan” at a future, undetermined date drops to miniscule and
undetectable levels. The years of overpayment are not, as some plans assert91,
the equivalent of an interest-free loan. On the contrary, the overpayment in
these cases is almost always the direct result of plan error that the retiree had
no reasonable way of detecting. This “solution” permits the plan to solve the
problem it created on the back of retirees living on a fixed income.
We suggest the adoption of formal hardship guidelines, which would
provide a measure of protection to participants. Specifically in cases where the
plan is solely at fault and repayment would cause significant hardship, we
support guidelines that, consistent with the result in Phillips, for example, bar
repayment and only permit a reduction in benefits to the correct amount going
forward.92
Consider two examples. First, suppose participant Y lives solely on a
pension of $24,000 per year. Through no fault of his, an overpayment of $700
per year for 12 years (or $8400) is discovered. Initially, a demand for full
repayment of $8400 from an annual income of $24,000 would leave Y with
$15,600 to live on. This amounts to a 35% drop in income and, in most parts
of the country this reduction puts Y well below the poverty level. 93 For this
fact situation, we propose guidelines that would forego any repayment,
especially if the plan is fully funded.
Second, if Z, like Y owes $8400 under identical conditions except that Z’s
income is $48,000 instead of $24,000 and Z has other significant assets,
guidelines that would permit a reasonable repayment schedule in order to
recoup no more than three years’ worth of overpayments would avoid pushing
Z into poverty.
The guidelines we envision would take, at a minimum, income, assets
(both liquid and illiquid) and disability status into account. In every innocent
participant recoupment case, fairness demands that the plan look to the
fiduciary or any other responsible entity before attempting to recover from the
participant. Even in cases of significant wealth, where the repayment would
not affect the participant in a meaningful way, fairness demands that the party
which made the initial error take responsibility for the chain of events it
91. See e.g., Forbes, supra note 30 at 1–3 (discussing the Triangle Wire overpayment
response: “Triangle Wire retirees were informed that future pension payments were being
reduced based on a recalculation of the correct benefit, but then also were told that they had to
reimburse the plan, with interest, for the overpayments…. [Triangle Wire’s] plan was an
‘‘ungenerous plan,’’ but… after the benefit amounts were recalculated, retirees were told their
benefits were being reduced to the correct amount, then reduced another 25 percent, and finally
that they were being charged 7.5 percent interest. Some retirees saw their benefits reduced by as
much as 80 percent”).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 33–44.
93. See generally U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Serv., U.S. Federal Poverty Guidelines
Used to Determine Financial Eligibility for Certain Federal Programs (Jan. 26, 2017),
https://aspe.hhs.
gov/poverty-guidelines (assuming Y is in a household of two).
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erroneously set in motion.
The plan, in cases like this, should be encouraged to look to the fiduciary
or other entity that is responsible for the error for compensation.94 In cases
where the plan is fully funded, the plan could almost certainly absorb the
typical loss. Where the plan is underfunded, it is in the best interest of all
parties to have a reliable source to turn to for indemnification following an act
of negligence.
C. Insurance
Finally, we argue, there is a real sense that the basic issue raised by
recoupment cases can be resolved with the fairly simple solution of insurance
coverage. The core of the recoupment story is invariably an act of simple or
gross negligence which is not discovered for some period of time and which
results in financial harm to the plan. Liability insurance is the well-accepted
method for risk transfer in cases of negligence that causes harm and this paper
argues that it offers the best possible solution to the problems described in this
paper.
To understand how this might work, we reimagine the facts in Brendan
Jones’ case: years after discovering that it had overpaid Jones, the Obelisk Plan
would notify both its liability carrier and Jones of its error and file a claim with
its insurer to recover some part of the loss covered by the policy.95 In order to
push back against moral hazard96, one would expect an insurer to cover a
portion, but not all, of an overpayment. Following an investigation which

94. “Where the participant did nothing to cause the overpayment, the plan should look at
the equities before seeking repayment from the participant. Several options should be examined
first including the plan absorbing the loss, the plan sponsor covering the loss, and fiduciary
insurance covering the loss. We note that the participant is usually the party with the lease ability
to cover the loss. Requiring the participant to pay for the mistakes of others is inequitable. In
cases where the plan is fully funded and the participant was not at fault, the plan should be
required only to correct the benefit going forward and not recoup the overpayment from the
participant. Where the plan is not fully funded, the plan should look first to fiduciary insurance if
there was a fiduciary breach and then to the plan sponsor for payment.” Letter from Ellen A.
Bruce to Internal Revenue Service, supra note 33, at 2.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 2–11.
96. See Mark Thoma, Explainer: What is “moral hazard”?, CBS MONEY WATCH (Nov. 22,
2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/explainer-moral-hazard/.
Moral hazard is a term describing how behavior changes when people are insured
against losses. If, for example, your car is fully insured against any and all damage and
there is no deductible, then you would have no incentive to avoid minor accidents, like
scratches or backing into poles, beyond the inconvenience of getting the car fixed. You
would be much more likely to take risks that could lead to minor car damage knowing
that any damage is fully covered…. Whenever people are protected from the downside
of their choices, they will tend to take on additional risk, sometimes excessively so. If
taking on extra risk has the potential to impose costs on other people, or puts other
people at risk in some way, such as in a financial system breakdown, then some
mechanism is needed to temper the risk-taking and protect innocent bystanders from
the consequences of morally hazardous behavior.
Id.
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confirmed Jones’ complete lack of culpability, the carrier would pay the claim
subject to policy terms; the insured plan may be required to cover a portion (10
or 20% for example) of the loss to insure its continued efforts at loss
prevention. Jones’ future payments would be reduced to the correct amount
and he would essentially be an implied co-insured97 on the plan’s policy, which
would protect him from any future attempts at subrogation.98
The plan and its carrier would enjoy the option to pursue claims against
any and all parties it believed were responsible for the overpayment to Jones.
Additionally, the plan would have to pay appropriate premiums to the carrier to
pick up and manage this risk. The beauty of the insurance mechanism in cases
like Jones’ is that both the insurer and the plan would be incentivized to
engage in regular audits and other reviews designed to limit years-long
overpayments.99 Errors should be caught quickly and if they are not, the plan
would face losing its coverage. Loss of coverage would presumably
negatively implicate a fiduciary’s duty of prudence giving rise to possible
claims for fiduciary breach by participants and beneficiaries.
Had the Obelisk Plan had insurance coverage it could turn to when it
discovered its many years of mistaken overpayments, Jones and his fellow
retirees would not have faced economic catastrophe as the plan scrambled to
retrieve the cash it wrongly paid out. Indeed, it seems reasonable to assume
97. The implied co-insured rule finds its roots in Landlord-Tenant Law, but could equally
be inserted in other insurance contexts. See Kevin J. Price, When is a Tenant an Implied CoInsured?, CUMMINS & WHITE LLP, http://www.cumminsandwhite.com/2012/09/when-is-atenant-an-implied-co-insured/ (“The innocent co-insured rule derives from the Oklahoma case of
Sutton v. Jondahl, a case arising from a fire caused by 10 year old John Jondahl and his chemistry
set. The logic behind the “Sutton Rule” goes like this: The fact that there is a landlord and tenant
implies that the tenant’s rent payments are paying the premiums on the property insurance
policy.”).
98. “The Sutton court opined that it would be unfair to allow an insurer to subrogate against
the tenant who was paying for the policy that gives rise to the subrogation action. That tenant, so
said the court, should be considered an insured such that the insurer would not be permitted to
subrogate against him. Thus, implied co-insured.” Id.
99. See Joanne Linnerooth-Bayer & M.J. Mace, Insurance-Related Actions and Risk
Assessment in the Context of the UNFCC, UNFCC (May 2003) (discussing insurance loss
prevention schemes in the context of natural disasters).
Risk estimation is an important part of managing natural disaster risks, and involves
three types of activities: (1) the reduction of the risks by preventing losses and
preparing for crises before disasters; (2) emergency response during the disaster; and
(3) providing relief and reconstruction after disasters. Because of the concern in many
developing countries that far more resources are spent on post-disaster activities at the
expense of proactive preventive measures, the concept of integrated disaster risk
management has become increasingly popular. This concept calls for a holistic
approach to disaster management activities, across different functions, across different
hazards, and taking into account the social, psychological and consequences of
disasters. An important extension of this concept has become known as financial risk
management, which examines the ways in which insurance and other financial
instruments can be put into place to assure that countries and citizens can quickly and
effectively recover from disasters, and to link these instruments with preventive
measures.
Id. at 9.
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that an insurer standing behind the Obelisk Plan’s poor financial practices
would have discovered the errors earlier, which would have reduced both the
losses to the plan and the shock to Jones and his former coworkers.
V. CONCLUSION
The recoupment crisis appears to be a direct result of several factors: (1)
plan error compounded over time; (2) complicated calculations that are
affected by external factors like sales, mergers, and workers compensation
payments; and (3) increased pressure on plans to aggressively pursue payment
given the losses suffered in the most recent economic downturn. The upshot of
the recoupment actions we describe in this paper is surprise followed by a
profound threat to the livelihood of retirees who were in no way responsible
for the initial error and who had no way to discover that they were being
overpaid. The current legal regime provides insufficient protections to plan
participants, although the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Montanile casts
serious doubt over the ability of plans to pursue repayment of lump sum
payments using the equitable lien device. Of all of the proposals for improving
protections for people like Brendan Jones, we are most optimistic about simply
requiring that plans purchase insurance to protect against the possibility of
overpayment, thereby shielding participants from harsh recoupment actions
and ensuring that funds will nonetheless be available to plans that seek to
recover from their own mistakes.

